The Response of  Escape Clause  of GATT and Section 201 of the Tariff and Trade Act of 1974 to the Needs of Developing Countries by Fandel, Rochelle A.
THE RESPONSE OF "ESCAPE CLAUSE" OF GATT AND
SECTION 201 OF THE TARIFF AND TRADE ACT OF 1974
TO THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
INTRODUCTION
The protectionist fires, in the eyes of many, are burning uncon-
trollably.1 The United States is struggling to protect its own domes-
tic industry while continuing to promote its policy of global eco-
nomic growth.2 To accomplish this policy, the United States
implemented several of its own devices which could be termed
"protectionist." Generally, protectionism consists of measures to in-
sure that the economy and a domestic industry are safe from bur-
densome competition. Restraints, such as increased tariffs or quan-
titative limits, make it harder for foreign competitors to sell their
products in the United States.' The circumstances under which the
need for protectionism arises are often common among nations."
The United States, in opening its markets to foreign imports,
places its industry in competition with foreign goods. Very often,
these imports can be sold at a lower price than United States' pro-
duced goods because of the significantly lower production costs of
some foreign countries. United States producers are faced with tre-
mendous overhead costs including high wages, workers' compensa-
tion insurance, union costs and retirement benefits. For example,
the United States' footwear producers experienced difficulty when
faced with foreign competition for some of these very reasons.8 Sev-
eral foreign exporters and domestic importers started to dominate
the shoe market beginning in 1978.6 The foreign advantage con-
1. Mervosh & Jonas, The New Trade Strategy, Bus. WK., Oct. 7, 1985, at 90.
2. Id.
3. In the modern trade era, there has been a proliferation of barriers such as voluntary
export restraints (VREs) and orderly marketing agreements (OMAs). These are bilateral
arrangements between importing and exporting countries which place limits on the quantity
of goods shipped in the open market. These agreements generally apply to a particular type
of goods or industry.
Tariff increases are restrictive as to the cost rather than the quantity of importing. They
also apply to particular types of goods, but, unlike VREs and OMAs, tariff increases apply
to all nations importing that product. See generally D. YOFFIE, POWER AND PROTECTIONISM:
STRATEGIES OF THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES (1983).
4. The recent problem in the footwear industries is illustrative. Nonrubber Footwear,
USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55 (July 1985) [hereinafter cited as Footwear).
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id. at 7.
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sisted mainly of lower production costs and hence a less expensive
product to the consumer.7 The impending question with respect to
domestic producers is what can be done so that they can maintain
their share of the market.
Some of the responses to foreign competition are aimed at com-
batting "unfair" trade practices8 while others concentrate on fair
trading practices that threaten domestic industries. 9 In general,
when an industry in the United States begins to suffer the effects of
competition in the form of lower profits, declining production, in-
creasing plant closings and increased layoffs, it may turn to the
United States government for relief.10 An industry may ask for pro-
tection in the form of increased tariffs11 and restrictions on the
quantity of imports.12 The responses to fair trading practices are
not unlimited but must be within the guidelines offered by, among
others, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade1 8 and Section
201 of the Tariff and Trade Act of 1974.14
GATT is a multilateral trade agreement to which the United
States became a signatory in 1947.16 Shortly after World War II,
in response to the disrupted state of the world economy,16 the
United States and several other nations gathered to formulate a
coherent policy consistent with three assumptions: 17 1) international
trade is beneficial to economic growth; 2) self-interested policies
breed unstable relations and inhibit trade cooperation; and 3) an
international agreement is the most efficient means of accomplish-
ing stated goals because individual efforts are easily frustrated.1 8
7. Id. at 5.
8. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) are designed to allow for a
response to foreign imports which are being traded unfairly. Goods entering the U.S. because
of subsidies, dumping or countervailing duties come within the purvue of this statute. 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. 11 1985) allows domestic producers to seek governmental
relief when imported goods compete with domestic goods in a potential violation of a patent
or a trademark.
9. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
10. Id.
11. Id. An increased tariff makes the sale of imported goods more expensive. This
effectively takes away some of the advantage of lower production costs.
12. Id. Quantitative restrictions place a maximum on the total number of a particular
product which can be sold in the restricting country.
13. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, reprinted as amended in H.R. Doc. 29-617, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974)
14. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)
15. See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. at 9-10.
18. Prior to 1934, the President had authority to enter into trade agreements on behalf
of the United States under the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934.
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This policy clearly indicates a desire for free world trade.19
Due to the hardship that GATT obligations can sometimes cre-
ate, Article XIX of GATT 20 establishes what is referred to as the
The history of GATT is conspicuously meshed with the attempted International Trade
Organization ("ITO") Draft Charter. See Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" For-
eign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59
MINN. L. REV. 461, 466-67 (1975). The ITO negotiations have been a source of interpretive
material for GATT. Some have questioned its persuasive authority on the grounds that
GATT was premised on the existence of the ITO.
The first talk of the ITO came from the Americans and the British who sought to prevent
further deterioration of the world market. In 1945, the United States prepared preliminary
draft proposals for the ITO and invited several nations to gather and consider an agreement.
After a series of preliminary conferences between 1946 and 1948, GATT emerged. The ini-
tial talk of GATT emanated from one of the committees at the 1946 London conference.
The final meeting of the ITO Draft Charter took place in Havana in 1947. At this point,
GATT was thrust into the center of attention when Congress refused to resubmit the draft
for congressional approval. GATT achieved its independent identity in 1947 when, during
the course of the Havana Charter, some twenty-three nations met to consider it.
19. The Preamble to GATT reflects the desires of the contracting nations to effectuate
this policy:
The Governments of the COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, the KINGDOM OF
BELGIUM, the UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL, BURMA, CANADA, CEYLON, the REPUBLIC
OF CHILE, the REPUBLIC OF CHINA, the REPUBLIC OF CUBA, the CZECHOSLOVAK
REPUBLIC, the FRENCH REPUBLIC, INDIA, LEBANON, the GRAND-DUCHY OF LUXEM-
BURG, the KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, the KINGDOM OF
NORWAY, PAKISTAN, SOUTHERN RHODESIA, SYRIA, the UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA,
the UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employ-
ment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production
and exchange of goods,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international commerce...
Preamble to GATT, reprinted in H.R. DoC. 29-617, supra note 13, at 1.
20. Article XIX of GATT states:
Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obliga-
tions incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff conces-
sions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious
injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive prod-
ucts, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the ex-
tent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to
suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a
preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting party in the circum-
stances set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten
serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products in the
territory of a contracting party which receives or received such preference, the im-
porting contracting party shall be free, if that other contracting party so requests, to
suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the
concession in respect of the product, to the extent and for such time as may be
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury.
[Vol. 17
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Escape Clause. The Escape Clause allows a signatory or "con-
tracting party" 21 to literally escape its GATT obligations'2 if its
domestic industry is under the threat of serious injury as a result of
increasing foreign imports.23 The Escape Clause allows for the im-
plementation of protectionist measures despite the overall policy of
GATT being the promotion of unrestricted world trade.2
4
For the United States, the first problem arises in ensuring consis-
tency between relief measures and its GATT obligations.' This in-
cludes protectionist measures instituted under Section 201 which is
very similar to the Escape Clause." It allows the President to take
2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph I of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford the CONTRACTING
PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of
the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed
action. When such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to a pref-
erence, the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the action.
In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would be diffi-
cult to repair, action under paragraph I of this Article may be taken provisionally
without prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be effected im-
mediately after taking such action.
3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the
action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the
action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued,
the affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after
such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on
which written notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
the application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in the
case envisaged in paragraph i(b) of this Article, to the trade of the contracting
party requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent concessions or other
obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES do not disapprove.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph,
where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation
and causes or threatens serious injury in the territory of a contracting party to the
domestic producers of products affected by the action, that contracting party shall,
where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the
taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation, such concessions or
other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the injury.
GATT art. XIX, reprinted in H.R. Doc. 29-617, supra note 13, at 36-37.
21. GATT refers to the signatories as contracting parties.
22. It is not entirely clear what is meant by "GATT obligations;" however, one could
argue that it covers tariff concessions and the elimination or reduction of quantitative restric-
tions. See J. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 559; see also Preamble to GATT, supra note 19.
23. GATT art. XIX, supra note 20.
24. See Preamble to GATT, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
25. Comment, Foreign Industrial Targeting: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as
a Remedy, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 483 (1985).
26. Section 201 is considered an escape clause as well and was closely modeled after
GATT art. XIX. See generally Adams & Dirlam, Import Competition and the Trade Act of
1974: A Case Study of Section 201 and Its Interpretation by the International Trade Com-
mission, 52 IND. L.J. 535 (1977).
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measures"7 to protect domestic industries faced with injurious for-
eign import competition .2  The policy of Section 201 is to provide
short-term relief to domestic producers in order to prepare them for
unrestricted future import competition.29 By satisfying the statutory
requirements, one petitioning under Section 201 can obtain relief
from the government in the form of increased tariffs or quantitative
restrictions."0
The United States' second problem concerns the method of de-
termining whether the statutory requirements providing relief are
met. Collaterally, the United States faces a problem in ensuring
that the determinations made under Section 201 are consistent with
GATT. Of particular concern for the purposes of this Comment is
whether the manner of determination by countries in invoking the
Escape Clause and by the United States in invoking Section 201
adequately protects developing nations.3
Several GATT provisions mandate that preferential treatment be
given to developing nations. Article XVIII recognizes that the over-
all objectives of GATT32 can be best obtained through the develop-
ment of economies which are only able to support a low standard of
living and are in early development stages83 Those countries quali-
fying as "developing" are allowed to deviate from their GATT obli-
27. 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985).
28. Id. § 2251.
29. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1974).
30. See supra notes 11-12.
31. GATT defines developing nations as those which are only able to support the low-
est standard of living and whose industry is in the early stages of development. As amended,
article XVIII of GATT in part applies to developing nations:
Governmental Assistance to Economic Development
I. The contracting parties recognize that the attainment of the objectives of this
Agreement will be facilitated by the progressive development of their economies,
particularly of those contracting parties the economies of which can only support
low standards of living(] and are in the early stages of development.[]
3. The contracting parties recognize finally that, with those additional facilities
which are provided for in Sections A and B of this Article, the provisions of this
Agreement would normally be sufficient to enable contracting parties to meet the
requirements of their economic development. They agree, however, that there may
be circumstances where no measure consistent with those provisions is practicable to
permit a contracting party in the process of economic development to grant the
governmental assistance required to promote the establishment of particular indus-
tries[] with a view to raising the general standard of living of its people. Special
procedures are laid down in Sections C and D of this Article to deal with those
cases.
GATT art XVIII, reprinted in HR. Doc. 29-617, supra note 13, at 27-29.
32. See Preamble to GATT, supra note 19.
33. GATT art XVIII, supra note 31, 1 1.
[Vol. 17
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gations in order to secure a more favorable position in the market.34
Article XXIII protects developing countries by providing a proce-
dure through which they may obtain review of actions by any of the
other contracting parties which in any way nullifies or impairs any
benefit which is rightfully theirs under GATT."3 Articles XXXVI-
XXXVIII a6 pertain to the recognized need for all contracting par-
ties to afford preferential treatment to less developed nations.37 The
Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle, often considered to be the
cornerstone of GATT,38 also helps developing nations. Included in
34. Id. 3.
35. Paragraph I of Article XXIII of GATT allows developing nations to get special
review:
Nullification of Impairment
I. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it di-
rectly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to
the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals
to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the repre-
sentations or proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties con-
cerned within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in para-
graph 1(c) of this Article, the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred
to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties
which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on-the matter, as appropriate.
The CONTRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the Eco-
nomic and Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-
governmental organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary.
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to
justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the
application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other
obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circum-
stances. If the application to any contracting party of any concession or other obli-
gation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than
sixty days after such action is taken, to give written notice to the Executive Scre-
tary to the CONTRACTING PARTIES Of its intention to withdraw from this Agree:ent
and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the day on
which such notice is received by him.
GAAT art. XIX, reprinted in H.R. Doc. 29-617, supra note 13, at 39-40.
36. See infra Appendix A for the text of GATT arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII, reprinted in
H.R. Doc. 29-617, supra note 13, at 53-57.
37. GATT art. XXXVI, infra Appendix A, 1
38. Article I of GATT contains the Most Favored Nation principle:
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer
of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such
duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with
importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in
19871
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Article 1 and requiring equal treatment to all nations, operation of
the MFN principle results in comprehensive tariff reductions, even
though the reductions may have been initially aimed at aiding only
one country.3 9
The foregoing policy raises several important questions with re-
spect to protectionism. First, does the manner in which a determi-
nation is made by any of the contracting parties under the Escape
Clause protect developing countries? Second, does the manner in
which a determination is made by the United States under Section
201 protect developing countries? Third, does either manner of de-
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article lIII] any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
2. The provisions of paragraph I of this Article shall not require the elimination
of any preferences in respect of import duties or charges which do not exceed the
levels provided for in paragraph 4 of this Article and which fall within the following
descriptions:
(a)Preferences in force exclusively between two or more of the territories listed in
Annex A, subject to the conditions set forth therein;
(b)Preferences in force exclusively between two or more territories which on July
I, 1939, were connected by common sovereignty or relations of protection or
suzerainty and which are listed in Annexes B, C and D, subject to the condi-
tions set forth therein;
(c)Preferences in force exclusively between the United States of America and the
Republic of Cuba;
(d)Preferences in force exclusively between neighbouring countries listed in An-
nexes E and F.
3. The provisions of paragraph I shall not apply to preferences between the
countries formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire and detached from it on July 24,
1923, provided such prefernces are approved under paragraph 5 of Article XXV,
which shall be applied in this respect in the light of paragraph I of Article XXIX.
4. The margin of preference[] on any product in respect of which a preference is
permitted under paragraph 2 of this Article but is not specifically set forth as a
maximum margin of preference in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agree-
ment shall not exceed:
(a)in respect of duties or charges on any product described in such Schedule, the
difference between the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates provided
for therein; if no preferential rate is provided for, the preferential rate shall for
the purposes of this paragraph be taken to be that in force on April 10, 1947,
and, if no most-favoured-nation rate is provided for, the margin shall not ex-
ceed the difference between the most-favoured-nation and preferential rates
existing on April 10, 1947;
(b)in respect of duties or charges on any product not described in the appropriate
Schedule, the difference between the most-favoured-nation and preferential
rates existing on April 10, 1947.
In the case of the contracting parties named in Annex G, the date of April 10, 1947,
referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall be replaced by the
respective dates set forth in that Annex.
GATT art. 1, reprinted in H.R. Doc. 29-617, supra note 13, at 2-3 (footnote omitted).See
also S. WEINTRAUB, TRADE PREFERENCE FOR THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTIRES: AN ANALY-
SIS OF U.S. POLICY 7 (1966).
39. GATT art. I, supra note 38.
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termination reflect the preferential treatment that GATT intended
to afford to developing nations? The purpose of this Comment is to
examine these questions in the context of the Escape Clause and
Section 201 by analyzing the present methods of determining that
measures such as increased tariffs and quantitative restrictions are
necessary to protect the invoking countries' domestic industry.This
Comment will begin with an analysis of the Escape Clause.'0 Next,
a discussion will follow outlining the standards used in determining
whether a country can escape from its GATT obligations'" and
how, if at all, these standards protect developing countries.' 2 Sec-
tion 201 will then be considered in a similar manner.'3 A substan-
tial portion of this Comment will review the International Trade
Commission's authority to decide disputes and suggest relief under
Section 201 and how the lack of consistent standards affects devel-
oping nations." Finally, proposals for modifications to the Escape
Clause and Section 201 will be offered.
45
I. GATT ESCAPE CLAUSE
The Escape Clause was included in GATT at the insistence of
the United States government. One of the advantages of the Escape
Clause is that it allows contracting parties to institute unilateral
tariff increases or other trade barriers without having to seek prior
authorization from the other countries.' 6 Also, compensatory ad-
justment, which may consist of tariff reductions or lifting of quanti-
tative restrictions, is not required under GATT. Often, however, on
its own, the applicant party offers compensation.' 7 Finally, the Es-
cape Clause's basic advantage is that it allows applicants to escape
from GATT obligations when faced with hardship.48
A contracting party may escape from its GATT obligations by
40. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 105-74 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 83-84, 175-78 and accompanying text.
46. See Hudec, supra note 18, at 465; GATT art. XIX, supra note 20. It appears that
this could encourage more cautious countries to enter into tariff bindings. K. DAM, THE
GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 101 (1970).
47. K. DAM, supra note 46, at 101.
48. The Escape Clause also involves disadvantages. First, the clause is only available
for a single concession or a group of closely related concessions within an industry. Id. at
100. Second, the relief is temporary in nature. Id. In fact, it has been argued that the relief
measures imposed should be reassessed after the initial period of danger has passed. Adams
& Dirlam, supra note 26, at 540.
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satisfying a minimum of three elements: 1) imports must be enter-
ing in increased quantities; 9 2) the increase in imports must be as
a result of unforeseen developments and of existing GATT obliga-
tions;50 and 3) the increase in imports must cause serious injury to
a domestic industry.
51
The first prerequisite52 is usually not difficult to determine be-
cause of the availability of statistics.8 However, the problem fre-
quently encountered from an analytical standpoint is whether the
increase in imports should be relative or absolute. " Since each of
the three elements must be satisfied, it is crucial to choose a consis-
tent starting point and a consistent method of analysis for all three.
Moreover, with respect to an increase, there are no provisions
which allow for a higher level of an increase when the imports are
arriving from developing nations which need more protection for
their industries than do developed nations.
The requirement that the increase in imports must be the result
of unforeseen developments 5 and existing GATT obligations" pre-
sent problems of proof for one seeking to invoke the Escape Clause.
There is an initial difficulty in separating cause from pure coinci-
dence.57 Considering the growing complexity of international mar-
ket structures, this difficulty will continue to be one of the central
obstacles to obtaining relief under the Escape Clause.5 a The lan-
guage is ambiguous at best and does not afford interpretive
assistance.59
The final element, that the increase in imports must cause or
threaten serious injury, 60 can be broken down in order to analyze
"serious injury" separate from "cause." Causation, the ultimate
hurdle to overcome, is merely the last in a series. 6 ' Causation must
be established 1) when the serious injury is related to previous
GATT obligations; 2) when the serious injury relates to unforeseen
49. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
52. GATT art. XIX, supra note 20, 1 1(a).
53. See, e.g., J. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 558.
54. Id.
55. GATT art XIX, supra note 20, 11(a).
56. Id.
57. J. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 559-60.
58. Id.
59. It has been suggested that one way to determine cause would be to analyze what
specific changes in international obligations took place as a result of GATT. Id. at 557.
60. GATT art. XIX, supra note 20, 1 I(a).
61. K. DAM, supra note 46, at 101.
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developments; and 3) when the serious injury is the result of in-
creased imports.6 ' Hence, causation is a common theme throughout
all the Escape Clause requirements. The serious injury criteria has
evaded any black letter standards thus leaving the determination to
be made on a case by case basis.
A. The Escape Clause and Developing Nations
Undeveloped nations are at a distinct disadvantage when they
compete with more developed countries in the international mar-
ket.68 The various protectionist measures are likely to lead to severe
damage6 to the economic growth of these countries and the growth
of world economy. The constrictive nature of international trade
policies of some of the more prominent trading nations is perhaps
the most important and difficult obstacle for the developing nations
to overcome . 5 When GATT was formed, ten of the twenty-three
signatories were developing countries.6 Preferences given to devel-
oping countries are evidenced in several provisions of GATT. 7
These preferences, which were based on the differing levels of the
nations' development, insure a free flow of exports from the devel-
oping nations.6 8 The slow development of these countries dictate
that the more developed nations should focus on long-term world-
wide economic development rather than immediate trade
advantages."
The protectionary nature of the Escape Clause is a direct reflec-
tion of the standards under which a determination is made to allow
an escape from GATT obligations. The burden of proving causation
protects the developing nation by making it difficult for any appli-
cant to obtain relief.70 However, the causal relationship may be eas-
ier to isolate when the imports are coming from a developing coun-
try. The evidence used to establish causation is generally not
specific71 and the evidentiary requirements tend to be relatively in-
62. Id. at 101-02.
63. D. YOFFIE, supra note 3, at 213.
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id. at 17.
66. ECONOMIC RELATIONS AFTER THE KENNEDY ROUND 48 (E. Alting Von Geusau
ed. 1969).
67. See generally notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
68. Alting Von Geusau, supra note 66, at 51.
69. Id. at 3.
70. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
71. K. DAM, supra note 46, at 103.
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effective. 72 However, developing nations whose imports are not able
to easily penetrate a particular market may not know if their ac-
tions to gain entry will indeed cause an injury to a domestic indus-
try. In turn, this may discourage some developing nations from vig-
orously expanding their trade and hence economic growth. Also,
the vague injury definition has had the effect of expanding the
scope of the clause, rendering it more applicable to a wider variety
of situations.73 However, the vague causal criteria often provide
sufficient protection for the developing nations by making it difficult
for anyone wishing to escape its GATT obligation.7 4
The definition of serious injury has also avoided strict defini-
tion .7 The lack of standards creates important and varied ramifica-
tions for the developing country whose imports may be affected.
The loose definition of injury reduces the predictability of applica-
tion of the Escape Clause; however, this same ambiguity also pro-
vides the necessary flexibility if the affected industry or product
originates from a developing nation.
The remedies afforded under the Escape Clause also help to pro-
tect developing nations. There are two different types of remedies
available under the Escape Clause: suspension of GATT obligations
in whole or in part;7 6 and modification or withdrawal of conces-
sions.77 There are also several qualifications to these remedies.
First, the nation seeking relief under Article XIX must notify the
affected nation before any action can be taken.7  This allows the
affected nation a chance to consult and hopefully negotiate com-
pensatory relie 79 Second, the withdrawn GATT obligations must
be causally related to the increased imports.80 This qualification en-
sures that the suspension of GATT obligations will not be over-
broad. Third, the withdrawal must be limited to prevention of the
specific injury.81 Effectively, this will limit the withdrawal to a spe-
72. Id.
73. J. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 561. There is also a problem with the basic defintion
of injury. Id.
74. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
75. Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at 539.
76. J. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 564.
77. This would amount to changing an existing tariff which is not excessive. Id.
78. GAT art. XIX, supra note 20, 1 2.
79. Compensatory relief may be in the form of reduced tariffs on other items which
are not a threat to domestic industry at the time.
80. J. JACKSON, supra note 15, at 564.
81. For instance, one cannot increase tariffs beyond a reasonable level, that is to that
point which remedies the injury. Id.
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cific product, thereby limiting the scope of the action."' Fourth, the
withdrawal should be consistent with the MFN principle.
B. Conclusion
Most of the positive and negative aspects of the Escape Clause
would apply equally to developing and developed countries. How-
ever, since the continued growth of the less developed countries is
crucial to overall economic growth,83 careful review must be made
of the potential of the Escape Clause to unjustifiably injure these
countries. First, an added provision to the Escape Clause could re-
quire a more serious injury criterion. Second, more definite eco-
nomic and statistical standards could be formulated so that devel-
oping nations would have some way in which to predict whether
their imports will be likely targets of increased tariffs. Third, notice
and consultation could be made a requirement before any action
could be taken under the Escape Clause. Finally, when GATT obli-
gations are suspended or concessions withdrawn, compensatory
measures could be made mandatory. These changes would be con-
sistent with the policies of GATT to give preferential treatment to
developing countries." Moreover, they would continue to allow im-
plementation of the Escape Clause for those situations which war-
rant it. Similar considerations are applicable to remedies available
under United States domestic laws.
II. SECTION 201 OF THE TARIFF AND TRADE ACT OF 1974
In contrast to GATT, Section 201 of the Tariff and Trade Act of
1974 allows a domestic producer to seek relief from the United
States government under domestic laws. In their constant struggle
to impact the world economy and "repel invaders,"8 United States
industries often look to the public laws for a remedy when private
actions are not applicable.8 6 One such public remedy is Section
201. The preference of public over private action is the result of
82. Id. As is often the case with developing nations, production is limited to a fewer
number of products. A nation seeking relief in the form of increased tariffs will rarely ask for
narrowly defined relief. More often, it will seek relief broadly defined, i.e., the entire steel
industry.
83. See supra note I and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
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two modern phenomena.87 First, not only the industry, but also the
individual worker suffers from foreign competition." Second, the
problems of foreign competition are more complex" and become
emphasized when the United States' economy experiences periods
of inflation and recession. 90
The current U.S. trade policies must be strictly followed in order
for Section 201 to become a viable remedy for domestic industry.
Failure to do so could result in strained foreign relations and a sub-
sequent tendency for those nations which have had their own im-
ports restricted in some manner to retaliate by making the sale of
American goods abroad more difficult. There is, by necessity, an
intricate balance which must be maintained between the goals of
prosperous international trade on the one hand" and protection of
domestic industries on the other." Presently, domestic policy favors
relief to struggling industries."
A. The Role of Policy in the Application of 201
The current United States' trade policy can be summarized in
the following four principles: First, any limitations, restraints or
withdrawals of concessions with respect to imports must be consis-
tent with the United States' GATT obligations. 94 Second, the inter-
est of global economic growth is best served by multilateral rather
than unilateral or bilateral solutions.95 Third, the existing interna-
tional institutions should be further expanded to consider several
areas not presently covered under present international agree-
ments.96 Fourth, the President should be given increased latitude in
his efforts to liberalize world trade.97
87. Id. at 535.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Nordhause, Inflation Theory and Policy,.66 AM. ECON. REV. 59, 66 (1976).
91. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade, S. REP. No. 14 98th Cong., Ist Sess., pt.
1, at 5 (1983).
92. Id. at 6.
93. Associated with this policy is the Darwinian notion of survival of the fittest. Per-
haps if an industry cannot accomodate the influx of competitive goods, it is not adequately
serving the public's interest and should bow to the more efficient producer or make changes.
In its operation, the survival notion may give one seeking to invoke section 201 a tendency to
avoid petitioning for relief under the belief that it will signal failure. See B. Scott & G.
LODGE, U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 304 (1985).
94, S. REP. No. 14, supra note 91, at 7.
95. Id.
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The United States looks first to its domestic rules of law such as
Section 201 in formulating trade policy.9 8 These rules should not be
abused, for it is generally feared that imposition of trade restric-
tions will only result in protectionism on a global scale." These re-
strictions, if not imposed equally on all nations and all industries,
may make trading nations apprehensive about taking chances in
new markets. 100 The ultimate goal to be reached is a world market
free from barriers.101
The present policy is the culmination of lessons learned from
trade practices carried on forty-eight years ago in the period follow-
ing the Depression.1"2 In an effort to shield United States' indus-
tries from foreign competition, the government implemented sweep-
ing tariff increases 0 8 without any consideration as to what effect
these increases would have on the world economy.'" Since then,
the United States has been more careful in its trade practices, but
significant problems still remain. The following will focus on the
United States' response to fair trading practices of foreign competi-
tors and how these responses are consistent with the aforemen-
tioned policies but lack predictability and coherent standards.
B. The International Trade Commission and Section 201
The International Trade Commission was formed under the
Tariff Act of 1930.105 The Commission was given authority under
that act to investigate activities preliminary to, and in the aid of,
authorized investigations in international trade problems. 1" The
Commission is an executive agency composed of six individuals who
are appointed by the President with the consent of Congress.107
During the maximum five year period of a commissioner's tenure,
he hears a variety of actions under international trade statutes.10 8
One specific role of the Commission is to make determinations
under Section 201. The findings must conclude whether an article
98. B. SCOTT & G. LODGE, supra note 93, at 303.
99. Id. at 302.
100. Id. at 303.
101. Id. at 302.
102. Id. at 301.
103. Id. at 301, 302.
104. Id. at 302.
105. 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1982 & Supp. Il1 1985).
106. 19 C.F.R. § 201.7 (1985).
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is being imported in such increased quantities as to be a substantial
cause or threat of serious injury to the domestic industry producing
an article similar to or directly competitive with the imported arti-
cle. 109 The Commission makes its investigation on its own motion,
on the filing of a petition, on the request of the President or on the
resolution of the applicable congressional committees. 1 0 A peti-
tioner must represent a trade association, firm, certified or organ-
ized union or group of workers in order to file with the
Commission.1
Section 201 is similar to the GATT Escape Clause and was codi-
fied as part of the Trade Extension Act of 1962.112 One of the most
significant changes between the 1962 Act and the Tariff and Trade
Act of 1974 was that the latter eased the burden of proof by chang-
ing the major cause requirement to "substantial cause." '
Section 201 has far reaching effects'1 4 and is primarily designed
as a mechanism through which a domestic industry can attempt to
restrict foreign competition which interferes with its domestic well-
being. 115 Section 201 has great potential for misuse, 6 however,
and has encountered some stiff criticism:
[T]he ITC still has far to go, not only in providing an adequate
foundation for its conclusions, but in achieving consistency in its
reports....
, In a society that relies on precedent for the functioning of
its administrative and judicial institutions, the suppression of
thorough explanation for an executive decision saps the spirit of
due process.
17
This potential misuse affects developing nations such that the
guidelines under which the Commission determines if relief mea-
sures are appropriate must be carefully scrutinized. The following
discussion will outline the elements of a Section 201 determination
109. 19 U.S.C § 2251(b)(1) (1982).
110. Id. These committees are the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee.
111. Id. § 2251(a)(1). The only requirement here is that the petitioner include a state-
ment as to why import relief is sought.
112. 19 U.S.C.§ 1901 (1970), repealed by Pub. L. 98-618, Title VI, § 602 (d), (e), 88
Stat. 2072 (1972).
113. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982); Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at 537-38.
114. Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at 537.
115. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
116. "IT]he Trade Act of 1974 had unusual potential for both good and ill." Adams
& Dirlam, supra note 26, at 537.
117. Id. at 577.
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and conclude that the lack of legal or economic standards1 8 ren-
ders Section 201 a dangerous weapon.
C. Elements of a Section 201 Determination
Section 201 encompasses the following four elements: 1) industry
definition; 2) increased imports; 3) serious injury or threat of seri-
ous injury; and 4) increased imports as the cause of serious injury
or threat of serious injury.
1. Industry Definition
Often, the initial definition of "industry" will be crucial to deter-
mining a point of comparison.119 The statute itself does not define
what an industry is and Congress did not make it clear whether, to
obtain relief, the injury must be to the entire firm or only a portion
of its output relating to the imports.2 0 Section 201 allows the Com-
mission to define industry based on any of the following: what the
industry produces, 2' a portion of the producer which produces the
like or directly competing article 22 or a specific market or geo-
graphic area. 23 The obvious problems with defining industry arise
when a producer markets more than one product or is concentrated
in several areas. " The House Ways and Means Committee has
suggested that the Commission consider the question of serious in-
jury in the context of the productive resources'2" used in the divi-
sion or plants in which the article in question is produced. 2 6 "Like"
and "directly competitive"127 can be thought of as two distinct con-
cepts. 2 8 "Like" has been defined as substantial or inherent in in-
118. Id.
119. Id. at 546.
120. Id. at 552-53.
121. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (b)(3)(A) (1982). This section was recently amended to allow
the commission to consider even more variables it thinks are relevant. For an application of
these broad criteria, see Certain Canned Tuna Fish, USITC Pub. 1558, Inv. No. TA-201-53
(Aug. 1984); Unwrought Copper, USITC Pub. 1549, Inv. No. TA-201-52 (July 1984); Car-
bon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, USITC Pub. 1553, Inv. No. TA-201-51 (July 1984).
122. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(3)(b) (1982).
123. Id. § 2251 (3)(c).
124. Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at 546-47.
125. Such resources might include employees, physical facilities and capital
expenditures.
126. H.R. REp. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1973).
127. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982).
128. Footwear, supra note 4, at 26.
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trinsic characteristics. 29 Directly competitive items have been
termed those that are not identical but have a similar commercial
purpose or are adaptable for similar uses.'
In practice, the Commission is free to take whatever view it
chooses, whether narrow or broad.131 This discretionary determina-




Under Section 201, there must exist an actual increase in im-
ports or there must be some increase over a previous level of im-
ports.133 Crucial to the determination of an increase is the choice of
a starting point from which to measure, for when the increase is
from zero, the significance is less than when the increase is from an
existing base.134 The Commission often adopts its own standard of
tracing the increase for five years; however, this is not applied with
uniformity. 35
The express provisions of Section 201 offer little in the way of
coherent standards.3 6 The Commission's determination also uncov-
ers a wide array of applications that are essentially void of any le-
gal analysis. Quantitative measures alone will not suffice but they
may provide at least an economic basis for arriving at some consis-
tency.13 7 However, to ensure that consistency, there must also be a
legal basis to guide the Commission. "
129. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 29 at 122.
130. Id. The Commission made a crucial determination of industry in the Footwear
case which included both athletic and non-athletic footwear. Nonrubber Footwear, supra
note 4, at 9 (opinion of Chairwoman Stern). This initial finding made all subsequent analysis
dependent on this one set of statistics. For example, had the Commission included in the
"footwear industry" only non-athletic footwear, the data it reviewed to make its determina-
tion might have revealed that quantitative restrictions were not necessary. Id.
131.A Bolts, Nuts, Screws, USITC Pub. 747 (Nov. 1975) (opinion of Comm'r
Leonard).
132. Congress has agreed to let the Commission exercise its discretion and had every
intention of doing so when it enacted the legislation. Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at
541.
133. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(C) (Supp. 11 1985); S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 29, at
121.
134. Plant Hangers, USITC Pub. 797 (Dec. 1976).
135. For example, in the Footwear case, there was a strong disagreement as to
whether the increase should be measured by the increase in imports in relative market share
or the increase in imports as a function of the value in constant dollars. Footwear, supra note
4, at 30; see also Birch Plywood Doorskins, USITC Pub. 743 (Oct. 1978).
136. Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at 547.
137. Id. at 542.
138. Id. at 557. See also supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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3. Serious Injury or Threat of Serious Injury
At some point in the proceedings, the Commission must deter-
mine what constitutes serious injury in that context."3 9 In arriving
at a conclusion, the Commission may take into account the
following:
1) all economic factors it considers relevant; 40
2) the significant idling of productive facilities;""
3) the inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a
profitable level;"42 and
4) significant unemployment or underemployment."13
The hazy nature of the definition makes uniformity nearly impos-
sible. "4 The guidelines offer substantial leeway to the Commission.
The question will continue to be: What is serious? The answer will
be: Serious is that which is significant. But what is significant? The
most that can be gained from the legislative history is that the leg-
islature did not intend that injury mean only a temporary misfor-
tune. 45 Commissioner Liebler has suggested that serious injury is
"a major contraction of a domestic industry or its extinction. ' " As
a result of these flimsy criteria, the definitions have gone through
several transmutations. 1
7
An example of the difficulty in deciding what constitutes a seri-
ous injury can be found in the Nonrubber Footwear matter. There,
a majority of the Commission determined that a drop in operating
profits in the industry from 6.4% to 5.3% was significant. 48 The
Commission looked to dozens of balance sheet indicators, 14" but
failed to conclude which of these statistics was important or
whether the decline in profits and production was the cumulative
effect of some indicators and not others.
Section 201 also allows for relief when there is a threat of serious
injury.' 50 The Commission must define what constitutes a threat
taking into account the following factors:
139. Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at 542.
140. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
141. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (b)(2)(A) (1982).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at 554.
145. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 29, at 120-21.
146. Footwear, supra note 4, at 32. See also S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 29, at 119.
147. Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at 555.
148. Footwear, supra note 4, at 19.
149. Id.
150. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982).
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1) a decline in sales;
2) higher or growing inventory;
3) downward trend in production, profits, wages and employment
(or increasing underemployment).'
The legislative history does not supplement these general guidelines
but does indicate that the threat exists if the injury is not yet ex-
isting but is clearly imminent if the imports continue
unrestricted.'6 2
These enumerated factors do not adequately define injury.?'5
Each investigation before the Commission is sui generis such that
there is almost a complete lack of standards. 1"4 What constitutes a
serious decline in sales in the tuna industry could be rather insignif-
icant in the steel industry. The inability to make lateral compari-
sons with other industries causes the Commission to rely on per-
centage increases, decreases or relative declines. However, the
commissioners often review a biased accumulation of data and ma-
nipulable figures. Each party presents the data in a manner which
makes its case more appealing.
Even though the foregoing shows how legal and economic stan-
dards are not consistently applied, nowhere is the problem more
crucial than in the causal determination required by Section 201.155
Even if a petitioner is able to show an increase in imports and a
serious injury or a threat of a serious injury, he must also prove a
causal connection between the two.
4. Increased Imports as the Cause of Serious Injury or Threat
of Serious Injury
Cause is often the major issue in a Section 201 case 6 and is
often the basis of overruling an otherwise viable petition.1 57 Sub-
stantial cause necessary for relief has been defined as "a cause
which is important and not less than any other cause." 58 To find
such a cause, the Commission may look to an increase in imports
and a decline in the proportion of the market occupied by domestic
151. 19 U.S.C § 2251(b)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1985)
152. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 29, at 121.
153. Footwear, supra note 4, at 31.
154. See, e.g., Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at 557.
155. The example used by Adams and Dirlam of the specialty steel industry illustrates
this problem. Id. at 558.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (1982).
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goods. 159
The determination of cause under Section 201 is very complex' 6°
and the Commission's ability to deal with the issue is questionable.
First, there are insufficient statutory guidelines16" ' and an absence of
precedent to guide the Commission.' e ' Second, there is a limited
number of staff economists and lawyers, shortages of time and in-
consistent standards.' 6' The main problem with consistency is that
there is no analytical framework that can be regularly applied.'"
Therefore, a findng of cause is often made on a superficial basis." 5
While the broad definition of cause was intended to allow the Com-
mission to exercise its intuition, 66 it could not have been meant to
displace the application of legal or economic standards. 6
There are likely to be situations where the application of eco-
nomic or legal standards is impossible. From a legal standpoint, the
Commission has settled on a tort type "but for" analysis of
cause.' 68 From an economic standpoint, there is no one analytical
tool which predominates, nor is there one which gives a fair indica-
tion of what would constitute cause.16' Economists maintain that a
growth in imports would have a net positive effect on the economy
by increasing the intensity of competition. 70 This growth would
thus operate to reduce domestic prices and force producers to
change with fashions and technology.' 7' It is crucial that the foun-
dation be laid in order to determine injury in the context of com-
petitive world markets.
17
The determination of a causal relationship between increased im-
port and injury clearly is difficult. The statutory language which
states that a substantial cause is one which is not less than any
other is really ineffective.'7 There are obvious problems with what
will amount to "substantial.' ' The statute does recognize that
159. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1985).
160. Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at 558-59.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 560.
163. Id. at 558-59.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 29, at 121.
167. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
168. Adams & Dirlam, supra note 26, at 561.
169. Id. at 559.
170. Id. at 559-60.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 558.
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there may be several causes of the injury and only requires that one
of those causes be substantial. Perhaps the cause need only be im-
portant; the question remains unanswered.
D. Proposals
Taken together, the ambiguity of Section 201 presents problems
for developing countries in attemping to predict when their imports
will satisfy the statutory criteria and allow a domestic producer to
seek relief. They will be unable to protect themselves if the Com-
mission is suddenly swayed by political pressure to make an affirm-
ative decision. 17 5 The Commission is essentially ignorant of facts
which are relevant to domestic industries and those with respect to
foreign competition. This makes it difficult to formulate consistent
trade policies. 176 The following suggestions for amendment could
protect developing nations.
First, an amendment to Section 201 should provide for a higher
level of injury and more direct proof of causation when the alleg-
edly injurious import originates from developing countries. Second,
the statute should be amended to include a mandatory notification
requirement to the affected country of the investigation and the na-
ture of the complaint and relief sought. Third, compensatory relief
to the affected nation should be made automatically available.
Fourth, the investigation should follow up with a mandatory reeval-
uation after an eighteen month period to determine if the relief
measures are still necessary.1 77
The problems inherent in Section 201 are in no way uniquely
injurious to developing nations, however. But if world-wide free
trade is the ultimate objective of trade, then the welfare of these
countries which do not have the resources to adequately protect
their industries from protectionist practices should be a prime con-
sideration of any legislation. No one has gone so far as to say that
domestic industries should be made to suffer under the present stat-
utes. However, protectionist measures are unnecessary and even in-
appropriate when domestic industries have simply failed to manage
175. The organization of the Commission does not provide stringent protection from
political pressure. See 19 U.S.C. § 1330
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
176. B. ScoTT & G. LODGE, supra note 93, at 306.
177. Presently, relief can be effective for up to five years without mandatory review. 19
U.S.C. § 2253 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
[Vol. 17
21
Fandel: The Response of "Escape Clause" of GATT and Section 201 of the Ta
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
THE ESCAPE CLAUSE AND SECTION 201 OF TTA
their affairs properly.1 78
CONCLUSION
The Escape Clause and Section 201 are very similar in that they
allow United States' domestic industries a means to employ protec-
tionist measures when that industry is being injured by increased
foreign imports. It is generally believed that Section 201 is consis-
tent with GATT.17" However, the previous discussion clarifies that
the respective provisions might yield inconsistent results under cer-
tain circumstances. Section 201 has one significant distinction from
the Escape Clause in that the Commission's determination is not
conclusive of a grant of relief. The findings of the Commission are
reported to the President 80 who then makes a final determination
after taking into consideration several factors.1 81
The Commission has recommended that relief measures be taken
in thirty-two of the fifty-five cases that it has handled 8 2 but the
President has granted relief in only half of these. 83 So, it appears
intitially that the burden of proof is difficult and, after that hurdle
is overcome, the political forces preclude automatic relief.
The various changes which have been proposed for the Escape
Clause and Section 201 will begin to make these escape provisions
more responsive to the needs of developing countries. Other
problems may not become apparent until the Commission abuses its
discretion and the United States consistently violates GATT. It is
feared, however, that if the Commission and the President continue
to refuse to grant relief under Section 201 and if the pressures con-
tinue to mount in Congress, industries might push for automatic
relief after the Commission's ruling.'" The United States, while
maintaining domestic tranquility, should not sacrifice amenable for-
eign relations by responding with sweeping protectionism.
Rochelle A. Fandel*
178. Unwrought Copper, USITC Pub. 1549, Inv. No. TA-201-52 (July 1984).
179. See Comment, supra note 25, at 490.
180. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (1982).
181. Id. § 2252.
182. Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1985, at 32, cols. 1-2.
183. Id.
184. B. SCOTT & G. LODGE, supra note 93, at 307.
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1.[] The contracting parties,
(a)recalling that the basic objectives of this Agreement include
the raising of standards of living and the progressive develop-
ment of the economies of all contracting parties, and consider-
ing that the attainment of these objectives is particularly ur-
gent for less-developed contracting parties;
(b)considering that export earnings of the less-developed con-
tracting parties can play a vital part in their economic devel-
opment and that the extent of this contribution depends on
the prices paid by the less-developed contracting parties for
essential imports, the volume of their exports, and the prices
received for these exports;
(c)noting, that there is a wide gap between standards of living in
less-developed countries and in other countries;
(d)recognizing that individual and joint action is essential to fur-
ther the development of the economies of less-developed con-
tracting parties and to bring about a rapid advance in the
standards of living in these countries;
(e)recognizing that international trade as a means of achieving
economic and social advancement should be governed by such
rules and procedures-and measures in conformity with such
rules and procedures-as are consistent with the objectives set
forth in this Article;
(f)noting that the CONTRACTING PARTIES may enable less- devel-
oped contracting parties to use special measures to promote
their trade and development;
agree as follows.
2. There is need for a rapid and sustained expansion of the ex-
port earnings of the less-developed contracting parties.
3. There is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that less-
developed contracting parties secure a share in the growth in inter-
national trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development.
4. Given the continued dependence of many less-developed con-
tracting parties on the exportation of a limited range of primary
products,[] there is need to provide in the largest possible measure
more favourable and acceptable conditions of access to world mar-
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kets for these products, and wherever appropriate to devise mea-
sures designed to stabilize and improve conditions of world markets
in these products, including in particular measures designed to at-
tain stable, equitable and remunerative prices, thus permitting an
expansion of world trade and demand and a dynamic and steady
growth of the real export earnings of these countries so as to pro-
vide them with expanding resources for their economic
development.
5. The rapid expansion of the economies of the less-developed
contracting parties will be facilitated by a diversification[] of the
structure of their economies and the avoidance of an excessive de-
pendence on the export of primary products. There is, therefore,
need for increased access in the largest possible measure to markets
under favourable conditions for processed and manufactured prod-
ucts currently or potentially of particular export interest to less-
developed contracting parties.
6. Because of the chronic deficiency in the export proceeds and
other foreign exchange earnings of less-devloped contracting par-
ties, there are important inter-relationships between trade and fi-
nancial assistance to development. There is, therefore, need for
close and continuing collaboration between the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES and the international lending agencies so that they can contrib-
ute most effectively to alleviating the burdens these less-developed
contracting parties assume in the interest of their economic
development.
7. There is need for appropriate collaboration between the
CONTRACTING PARTIES, other intergovernmental bodies and the or-
gans and agencies of the United Nations system, whose activities
relate to the trade and economic development of less-developed
countries.
8. The developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity
for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or
remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed con-
tracting parties. []
9. The adoption of measures to give effect to these principles
and objectives shall be a matter of conscious and purposeful effort
on the part of the contracting parties both individually and jointly.
1987]
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Article XXXVII
Commitments
1. The developed contracting parties shall to the fullest extent
possible-that is, except when compelling reasons, which may in-
clude legal reasons, make it impossible-give effect to the following
provisions:
(a)accord high priority to the reduction and elimination of barri-
ers to products currently or potentially of particular export
interest to less-devloped contracting parties, including customs
duties and other restrictions which differentiate unreasonably
between such products in their primary and in their processed
forms; []
(b)refrain from introducing, or increasing the incidence of, cus-
toms duties or non-tariff import barriers on products currently
or potentially of particular export interest to less-developed
contracting parties; and
(c)(i) refrain from imposing new fiscal measures, and
(ii) in any adjustments of fiscal policy accord high priority to
the reduction and elimination of fiscal measures, which would
hamper, or which hamper, significantly the growth of con-
sumption of primary products, in raw or processed form,
wholly or mainly produced in the territories of less-developed
contracting parties, and which are applied specifically to those
products.
2. (a) Whenever it is considered that effect is not being given to
any of the provisions of sub-paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph
1, the matter shall be reported to the CONTRACTING PARTIES either
by the contracting party not so giving effect to the relevant provi-
sions or by any other interested contracting party.
(b)(i) The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall, if requested so to do by
any interested contracting party, and without prejudice to any
bilateral consultations that may be undertaken, consult with
the contracting party concerned and all interested contracting
parties with respect to the matter with a view to reaching so-
lutions satisfactory to all contracting parties concerned in or-
der to further the objectives set forth in Article XXXVI. In
the course of these consultations, the reasons given in cases
where effect was not being given to the provisions of sub-para-
graph (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 1 shall be examined.
(ii) As the implementation of the provisions of sub-paragraph
[Vol. 17
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(a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 1 by individual contracting par-
ties may in some cases be more readily achieved where action
is taken jointly with other developed contracting parties, such
consultation might, where appropriate, be directed towards
this end.
(iii) The consultations by the CONTRACTING PARTIES might
also, in appropriate cases, be directed towards agreement on
joint action designed to further the objectives of this Agree-
ment as envisaged in paragraph 1 of Article XXV.
3. The developed contracting parties shall:
(a)make every effort, in cases where a government directly or
indirectly determines the resale price of products wholly or
mainly produced in the territories of less-developed con-
tracting parties, to maintain trade margins at equitable levels;
(b)give active consideration to the adoption of other measures[]
designed to provide greater scope for the development of im-
ports from less-developed contracting parties and collaborate
in appropriate international action to this end;
(c)have special regard to the trade interests of less-developed
contracting parties when considering the application of other
measures permitted under this Agreement to meet particular
problems and explore all possibilities of constructive remedies
before applying such measures where they would affect essen-
tial interests of those contracting parties.
4. Less-developed contracting parties agree to take appropriate
action in implementation of the provisions of Part IV for the benefit
of the trade of other less-developed contracting parties, in so far as
such action is consistent with their individual present and future
development, financial and trade needs taking into account past
trade developments as well as the trade interests of less-developed
contracting parties as a whole.
5. In the implementation of the commitments set forth in
paragraphs 1 to 4 each contracting party shall afford to any other
interested contracting party or contracting parties full and prompt
opportunity for consultations under the normal procedures of this
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Article XXXVIII
Joint Action
1. The contracting parties shall collaborate jointly, within the
framework of this Agreement and elsewhere, as appropriate, to fur-
ther the objectives set forth in Article XXXVI.
2. In particular, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall:
(a)where appropriate, take action, including action through in-
ternational arrangements, to provide improved and acceptable
conditions of access to world markets for primary products of
particular interest to less-developed contracting parties and to
devise measures designed to stabilize and improve conditions
of world markets in these products including measures
designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices
for exports of such products;
(b)seek appropriate collaboration in matters of trade and devel-
opment policy with the United Nations and its organs and
agencies, including any institutions that may be created on
the basis of recommendations by the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development;
(c)collaborate in analysing the development plans and policies of
individual less-developed contracting parties and in examining
trade and aid relationships with a view to devising concrete
measures to promote the development of export potential and
to facilitate access to export markets for the products of the
industries thus developed and, in this connexion, seek appro-
priate collaboration with governments and international orga-
nizations, and in particular with organizations having compe-
tence in relation to financial assistance for economic
development, in systematic studies of trade and aid relation-
ships in individual less-developed contracting parties aimed at
obtaining a clear analysis of export potential, market pros-
pects and any further action that may be required;
(d)keep under continuous review the development of world trade
with special reference to the rate of growth of the trade of
less-developed contracting parties and make such recommen-
dations to contracting parties as may, in the circumstances, be
deemed appropriate;
(e)collaborate in seeking feasible methods to expand trade for
the purpose of economic development, through international
harmonization and adjustment of national policies and regula-
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tions, through technical and commercial standards affecting
production, transportation and marketing, and through export
promotion by the establishment of facilities for the increased
flow of trade information and the development of market re-
search; and
(/)Establish such institutional arrangements as may be necessary
to further the objectives set forth in Article XXXVI and to
give effect to the provisions of this part.
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